Hume On Miracles

Although David Hume’s famous argument against the intelligibility of miracles continues to pose a serious challenge to Christian theology, the epistemological ground on which his argument once stood has undoubtedly been shaken in recent decades. Hume’s unwavering confidence in his method of reasoning is matched only by the deep skepticism (and might I add arrogance!) he holds toward any kind of authority or received tradition. In his view, any knowledge that is gained through tradition, especially religious tradition must be held suspect, for it always has some other agenda and always intends to delude the ignorant. Of course, all knowledge is and always has been received knowledge and tradition-based; Hume’s confidence in human progress and ever-increasing human enlightenment has, indeed, collapsed. His naive confidence in the objectivity, neutrality, and untraditionedness of his enterprise has been rightly exposed and has been found wanting.

Besides our contention that Hume’s whole enterprise rests on shaky epistemology, there are a number of other critiques one could advance against Hume. For instance, Hume’s argument against miracles presupposes that miracles do not exist a priori. As Terence Nichols has pointed out Hume’s very definition of miracles as that which violates the laws of nature is calculated. Further, Wolfhart Pannenberg has rightly argued that Hume’s definition is “a self-defeating notion of miracle.” After all, the whole concept of natural law presupposes that nothing can contradict or oppose it. Indeed, if an event did occur that contradicted natural law it would have only seemingly done so, for this would demonstrate that it never was truly a natural law. Thus, in Pannenberg’s words, “The concept of miracle as violation of natural law subverts the very concept of law and in effect exposes the futility of the assertion of miracles.” However, as Pannenberg contends, this is not the traditional Christian definition of miracles at all. Thus Hume’s whole attack is against a straw person. In agreement with Nichols and Pannenberg, I think that any response to Hume’s attack against miracles must begin from a different understanding of miracles. Indeed, as both Nichols and Pannenberg argue, we should not view miracles as a violation of the laws of nature. This is in keeping with both Augustine and Aquinas, neither of whom understood miracles as events contra to the laws of nature.