A great number of modern theologians make the claim that God suffers. Indeed, the belief that God suffers is so widespread that it has been called a new orthodoxy. It is usually argued that in contrast to much patristic thought, biblical thought depicts a God that is intimately and radically involved in the world. The patristic notion of divine impassibility (that God does not suffer) is commonly attributed to Hellenistic influences on Christianity. After all, it was the Hellenistic gods who were “static” and without feeling or concern for the world, whereas the biblical God of Israel was “active,” sympathetic, emotional, even to the point of suffering with his people. It was the great Adolf von Harnack who argued that the development of doctrine experienced a period of massive and widespread Hellenization. As Paul Gavrilyuk points out, “The process of Hellenization for Harnack had a negative connotation: it implied a deterioration of the originally unadulterated gospel into a rigid doctrinal system” (Gavriyuk 3). First of all, we must say that the stark contrast commonly made between Hebrew and Greek thought is highly questionable from an historical perspective. Second, it is theologically problematic to reject Hellenistic influence out of hand for the sake of some pure Hebraic mode of thinking. In his wonderful book The Suffering of the Impassible God, Gavrilyuk argues against what he calls the “Theory of Theology’s Fall into Hellenistic Philosophy.” Gavrilyuk rightly points out that the stark distinction drawn between the unemotional and uninvolved God of the philosophers and the passionate God of the Bible is “fundamentally flawed and misleading both with regard to the opinions of the philosophers and with regard to the biblical material” (Gavrilyuk 21). He notes that it is common to read the early Fathers with this distinction in mind. Gavrilyuk convincingly argues that matter is much more complex. There is no unified Greek view on the matter of God’s suffering neither is there a unified biblical view.
In chapter four of God Matters Herbert McCabe discusses “the involvement of God” in the world. McCabe is concerned with this question of the (im)passibility of God, that is, does God involve himself in the world in such a way so as to experience suffering? In recent times many theologians have dismissed figures like Thomas Aquinas for saying too much about God’s nature philosophically without enough reference to God’s self-revelation in Christ. For instance, McCabe quotes one of the foremost proponents of passibility, Jürgen Moltmann on Aquinas’ Five Ways:
The cosmological proof of God was supposed by Thomas to answer the question utrum Deus sit, but he did not really prove the existence of God; what he proved was the nature of the divine, . . . Aquinas answered the question “What is the nature of the divine?,” but not the question “Who is God?” (Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, 12).
Interestingly, as McCabe points out this is exactly what Aquinas avoided. In regular apophatic fashion, Aquinas believed that we cannot know what God is, that is his nature, but only what he is not. For Aquinas, even God’s self-revelation in Christ does not change the incomprehensibility of God. In McCabe’s words,
it is extremely difficult for readers of Aquinas to take his agnosticism about the nature of God seriously. If he says ‘Whatever God may be, he cannot be changing’ readers leap to the conclusion that he means that what God is is static. If he says that, whatever God may be, he could not suffer together with (sympathize with) his creatures, he is taken to mean that God must by nature be unsympathetic, apathetic, indifferent, even callous. It is almost as though if Aquinas had said that God could not be a supporter of Glasgow Celtic, we supposed he was claiming God as a Rangers fan. (McCabe, God Matters 41).
Thus, McCabe reminds us that when reading Aquinas we should be careful not to jump to conclusions when we read that God “cannot be changing.” He goes on, “As with the Celtic and Rangers, it does not follow that, if God is not affected by, say, human suffering, he is indifferent to it. In our case there are only two options open: we either feel with, sympathize with, have compassion for the sufferer, or else we cannot be present to the suffering, we must be callous, indifferent. We should notice, however, that even in our case it is not an actual ’suffering with’ that is necessary for compassion, but only a capacity to suffer with. Sharing in actual pain is neither necessary nor sufficient for compassion, whose essential components are awareness, feelings of pity and concern” (McCabe God Matters 44). However, McCabe notes that God cannot literally be understood to have “feelings” of compassion.
McCabe explains that when we have compassion for others, when we are present to another’s suffering we want nothing less than to fully take on that suffering, but we cannot do this because we are always outside the other person. Compassion is all that we have and there is always a sense of frustration involved in remaining outside of the other person, that is, not being able to fully be with the other. In contrast, God, as the creator cannot be outside of his creature; “a person’s act of being as well as every action done has to be an act of the creator” (44). Thus, “if the creator is the reason for everything that is, there can be no actual being which does not have the creator as its centre holding it in being” (45). In McCabe’s view, our compassion is a feeble attempt to be “what God is all the time: united with and within the life of our friend” (45). With Augustine and Aquinas McCabe affirms that precisely in being transcendent God is intimately involved with each creature much more than creatures could be with one another.
In the second part of his essay, McCabe argues that the rise in the belief of a suffering God is correlative to a weakening and at times a misunderstanding of the traditional doctrine of the incarnation. In accordance with the doctrine of Chalcedon McCabe speaks of the one person of the Jesus as truly human and truly divine. Following Chalcedon McCabe affirms that we can say “quite literally that God suffered hunger and thirst and torture and death” (46). The traditional doctrine allows us to affirm that the Son of God assumed a human nature and therefore we can say that God suffered in his human nature. But McCabe cautions against speaking more generally of God suffering as if it was by virtue of something in Jesus’ divine nature that he suffered. For instance, we can say that “The Son of God died on the cross” and also “God died on the cross,” but though God signifies Jesus divine nature it refers to what has this nature, that is Jesus of Nazareth.
McCabe goes on to argue that “the doctrine of the incarnation is such that the story of Jesus is not just the story of God’s involvement with his creatures but that it is actually the “story” of God. There is one sense in which we must say that God has no life-story - and it is essential to my thesis to insist on this, as we shall see - but there is also a sense, the only sense, in which God has or is a life-story, and this is the story revealed in the incarnation and it is the story we also call the Trinity” (48). Thus, for McCabe the incarnation is the story of the triune God. He beautifully asserts, “The story of Jesus is nothing other than the triune life of God projected onto our history, or enacted sacramentally in our history, so that it becomes story” (48). McCabe’s shows us his radical Christocentricism and his sacramental theology here. The story of Jesus is the projection of the trinitarian life of God on “the rubbish dump that we have made of the world” (48). The story of Jesus is sacramental in that it not only signifies the trinitarian life of God, but it contains the reality it signifies. Thus, “the mission of Jesus is nothing other than the eternal generation of the Son. That the trinity looks like a story of (is a story of) rejection, torture and murder but also of reconciliation is because it is being projected on, lived out on, our rubbish tip; it is because of the sin of the world” (49).